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ESSAYS
COOPERATIVE (AND UNCOOPERATIVE)
FEDERALISM AT TRIBAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LEVELS:
A CASE FOR COOPERATIVE CHARGING
DECISIONS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Danna R. Jackson, Esq.*
I. A TALE OF TWO DEFENDANTS
A. Case Study #1—Non-Indian vs. Indian—Misdemeanor Assault
A non-Indian (Defendant) returned to the home he shared with his do-
mestic partner (Victim), who is an Indian. Defendant kicked in the door and
threw a lighter at Victim. The lighter hit her in the face. She tried to leave
with their two children. Defendant locked the front door, precluding escape.
Victim and the children then tried to leave out the back door, after which
Defendant struck Victim on the head and the face, took the youngest child,
and departed. Victim suffered bruising to her face and a possible broken
nose, but she did not seek medical care. The first officer to arrive at the
scene took pictures of Victim and took her statement.
The crime occurred within the boundaries of a federal jurisdiction res-
ervation. Defendant was apprehended by the tribal police and was later
taken into custody by the County. Defendant had a prior federal felony con-
* Danna R. Jackson is an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Montana. She is part
of the District’s Indian Country Crime Unit. Jackson prosecutes violent crime that arises in Indian Coun-
try. Although all Indian Country Crime Unit attorneys have liaison duties, Jackson is designated as the
District’s tribal liaison. In that capacity, she facilitates the government-to-government relationship be-
tween the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the tribal governments and responds to training requests from
tribal courts, tribal advocate programs, and tribal law enforcement. She also works with national and
state agencies and organizations that work in and around Indian Country in Montana.
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viction (nonviolent) but was not subject to federal supervision at the time of
this new offense. In the federal system, Defendant could receive a sentence
of no more than six months for misdemeanor assault.1
B. Case Study #2—Indian v. Indian—Felony Assault
An Indian (Defendant), driving south on a highway, turned west into a
tribal casino parking lot and was struck by another vehicle traveling north.
The driver of the second vehicle had the right-of-way. The one passenger in
Defendant’s vehicle suffered minor injuries. The second vehicle carried
three passengers, including a young man (Victim) who suffered a left hip
fracture. Victim is expected to have permanent injuries as a result of the
collision; the other two passengers suffered minor injuries.
Immediately following the collision, Defendant went into the tribal ca-
sino and asked someone to call the police. He told law enforcement that he
did not know who was driving the vehicle he was in. Defendant was then
transported to the hospital and treated for minor injuries. A toxicology re-
port indicated Defendant had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.265 and
screened positive for both opiates and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). Defen-
dant later changed his story and admitted guilt. Because of the seriousness
of the injuries suffered by the Victim, this matter could be considered a
felony assault.
This accident happened within the boundaries of a federal jurisdiction
reservation. The Defendant had no federal criminal history, but had exten-
sive tribal criminal history, including alcohol related offenses. In the federal
system, the anticipated sentence for such a crime is 27–33 months based on
(1) the aggravated assault (base offense level 14); (2) permanent injury to
the victim (increase 7 levels); and the defendant’s number of prior offenses
(in this instance the Defendant had no felony offenses so his criminal his-
tory did not affect the sentence).2
II. DISPENSING JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
In the case studies above, both the tribal and the federal government
could charge these cases in their respective courts.3 But which authority
should charge these cases? And if the answer is both, how do we go about
making sure the charging decisions are fair and just?
1. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A2.3 (2014).
2. Id.
3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1304 (2012).
2
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Indian Country has been plagued by systemic violence.4 Statistics
show that American Indians are victims of violent crime at least twice as
often as other racial groups.5 It is paramount that justice systems work to-
gether in a coordinated fashion to address the violence. We must do better.
Until recently, tribal courts were only able to sentence a criminal up to one
year and levy a $5,000 fine.6 Additionally, a tribal court did not have crimi-
nal jurisdiction over a non-Indian perpetrator.7 The Tribal Law and Order
Act of 20108 and Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 20139
permit tribes to opt into the restoration and expansion of tribal court juris-
diction, which over the years had been stripped away by Congress and the
courts.10
The Tribal Law and Order Act authorizes tribes to bring felonious
criminal matters that arise on their reservation in tribal court. The Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 authorizes tribal courts to as-
sert jurisdiction over non-Indian perpetrators of domestic violence. This
means that for the first time in decades, tribes can handle certain felonies
and crimes of domestic violence in their own systems and on their own turf.
But this does not mean that the federal government can abandon its prose-
cution obligations. Most tribal systems do not have the resources to dis-
pense justice as holistically and comprehensively as they may want—many
times the United States is the only entity with the resources to address the
crime. Therein lies the dilemma.
This article provides a summary description of the major federal acts
and case law that provide the framework for criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country.11 Next, the article summarizes the sections of the Tribal Law and
Order Act and the Violence Against Women Act that pertain to jurisdiction.
The article concludes with a description of some of the programs in effect
in Montana today, which detail the “best practice” models of communica-
4. Felix Cohen, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 730 (5th ed.) (citing Callie Rennison,
Violent Victimization and Race 1993-1998, 1, 10 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001)); see also Lawrence
A. Greenfeld & Steve K. Smith, American Indians and Crime (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1999) (gen-
eral look at crime statistics); Stewart Wakeling et al., Policing on American Indian Reservations 13–21
(National Institute of Justice 2001) (detailed look at gathering crime statistics specific to Indian coun-
try).
5. Id.
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
7. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194–195 (1978).
8. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2815.
9. Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
10. Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(b), 124 Stat. 2258, 2263 (2010).
11. For outstanding explanations of Indian Country jurisdiction see Timothy Droske, Correcting
Native American Sentencing Disparity Post Booker, 91 Marq. L. Rev. 723, 761–762 (2008); see also
Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes 127–148 (4th ed., Oxford U. Press 2012).
3
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tion and coordination between the tribal and federal systems to address the
violence in Indian Country.
III. BRIEF EXPLANATION OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
A person might assume that a tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over all
criminal matters that arise within its boundaries. After all, in Johnson v.
M’Intosh,12 the United States Supreme Court held that tribes have full juris-
diction over on-reservation activities, to the exclusion of state law.13 Less
than ten years later, the Court twice agreed that tribes’ sovereign powers are
retained unless relinquished through treaty or expressly limited by the ple-
nary power of the United States Congress.14
Since the Supreme Court established the jurisdictional framework,
Congress has passed laws that permit both the state and the federal govern-
ment to exercise criminal jurisdiction within reservation borders.15 The four
most significant laws affecting criminal jurisdiction are Public Law 83-280
(PL 280),16 the Indian Country Crimes Act (also known as the “General
Crimes Act” or the “Federal Enclaves Crime Act”),17 the Indian Major
Crimes Act of 1885 (Major Crimes Act),18 and the Indian Civil Rights
Act.19
A. In Montana, Public Law 280 Only Applies to the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes
Congress enacted PL 280 in 1953. This statute authorized states to
assume criminal and certain types of civil jurisdiction on reservations.20
Originally, Congress mandated that certain states assume this type of juris-
diction.21 The original 1953 text of PL 280 allowed states to unilaterally
assume jurisdiction.22 Congress responded to tribal opposition with an
amendment to PL 280 in 1968 that included a tribal consent requirement to
12. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
13. Id. at 603–605.
14. Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1, 14 (1831); Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 534 (1832).
15. Pevar, supra n. 11, at 128–129.
16. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321–1326; 28 U.S.C. § 1360).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1153; Pevar, supra n. 11, at 128 (Pevar identifies Public Law 83-280, the Indian
Country Crimes Act, and the Major Crimes Act as the “three most important laws” affecting criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country.).
19. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304.
20. See e.g. 18 U.S.C.§§ 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1322.
21. Ada Pecos Melton & Jerry Gardner, Public Law 280: Issues and Concerns for Victims of Crime
in Indian Country, http://perma.cc/6QTD-BAS4 (http://www.aidainc.net/Publications/pl280.htm)
(2013).
22. 67 Stat. at 588.
4
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the change to state jurisdiction and an opportunity for the tribes to decide to
withdraw the state’s assumption of jurisdiction under the original version of
the law.23 “The only Montana tribes to agree to the new version of the law
were the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes.”24
B. Major Crimes Act
Prior to the enactment of the Major Crimes Act, Crow Dog was con-
victed for the murder of Sin-ta-ge-le-Scka, or in English, Spotted Tail.25
Crow Dog and Spotted Tail were Indians from the same band and nation,
and the homicide occurred in Indian Country.26 Crow Dog filed a writ of
habeas corpus claiming that the United States district court had no jurisdic-
tion to try him.27 The jurisdictional analysis hinged on whether the Fort
Laramie Treaty left exclusive jurisdiction of Indian-on-Indian crime within
Indian Country to the tribe.28 The Court said that it did.29 The conviction
and sentence were deemed void and Crow Dog’s imprisonment was there-
fore considered illegal.30
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act.31 The Ma-
jor Crimes Act grants the federal government criminal jurisdiction over an
enumerated list of crimes committed by an Indian against an Indian in In-
dian Country.32 In sum, the Major Crimes Act handed the federal govern-
ment substantial power to contend with violent crime in Indian Country.
C. Indian Country Crimes Act
The Major Crimes Act only applies to crimes committed by Indians.
Congress passed the Indian Country Crimes Act “to provide for prosecution
23. Mont. Off. of Pub. Instr., Flathead Reservation Timeline: Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes 7, http://perma.cc/W6PZ-MDG3 (http://www.opi.mt.gov/Pdf/IndianEd/IEFA/FlatheadTime
line.pdf) (2010).
24. Id.; Mont. Code Ann. § 2–1–301 (2013).
25. Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
26. Id. at 556–557.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 567–568.
29. Id. at 572.
30. Id.
31. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Criminal Resource Manual § 679 (available at http://perma.cc/65QY-TUU2
(http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00679.htm)).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (“Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another In-
dian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maim-
ing, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, a felony assault under section 113, an assault against an
individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary,
robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the
same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States.”).
5
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of crimes by non-Indians against Indians and of non-major crimes by Indi-
ans against non-Indians.”33 The Indian Country Crimes Act provides for
“federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes only.”34 In other words, if a
non-Indian commits a crime against an Indian, or vice/versa, the crime
would be charged under this section of the federal code, instead of the Ma-
jor Crimes Act.
D. Indian Civil Rights Act
The Indian Civil Rights Act was passed “to ensure that the American
Indian is afforded the broad Constitutional rights secured to other Ameri-
cans . . . [in order to] protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust
actions of tribal governments.”35 The rights conferred by the Indian Civil
Rights Act include many of the same rights contained in the United States
Bill of Rights, except the establishment clause.36 Also, the Indian Civil
Rights Act permits a person the right to hire a lawyer in a criminal case, but
does not mirror the language in the Bill of Rights that provides “In all crim-
inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense” or counsel paid at the expense of the
government.37
Important to our discussion here, the Indian Civil Rights Act limited
the sentence a tribal court could impose on a defendant.38 Tribal courts
could only sentence a defendant up to one year for each offense.39 Further,
tribal courts could only sentence the defendant for three offenses.40 In other
words, in total, a tribal court could only potentially sentence a defendant up
to three years.41 Although a tribe may have limitations on its ability to sen-
tence, Congress has not abrogated tribes’ right to assert jurisdiction over
major crimes.42 So, for example, should a tribe provide the authority in its
tribal code, a tribe can charge a major crime––like sexual assault without
consent or murder. But again, if the defendant is convicted of the tribal
charge, he or she can only be sentenced up to one year.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1152; Willam C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 173 (5th ed., West
2009).
34. U.S. v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting U.S. v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 974
(10th Cir. 2001)).
35. S. Rep. No. 841, 90th Sess. 6 (1967). See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61
(1978).
36. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
37. U.S. Const. amend VI.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (superseded, in part, by 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) as stated
in U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004)).
6
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E. A Romp through Cases Affecting Tribal Authority
1. Tribes and the Federal Government Share Jurisdiction over Crimes
that Arise on Federal Jurisdiction Reservations
The question then arises, if both the United States and the tribal gov-
ernment have criminal authority to charge the same Indian person for the
same crime: is that not a blatant violation of double jeopardy?43
Wheeler, a member of the Navajo Tribe, pleaded guilty in Tribal Court
to a charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and was sen-
tenced.44 Subsequently, he was indicted by a federal grand jury for statutory
rape arising out of the same incident.45 He moved to dismiss the indictment
on the ground that since the tribal offense of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor was a lesser-included offense of statutory rape, the Tribal Court
proceeding barred the subsequent federal prosecution.46
The Supreme Court found that the Navajo Nation’s exercise of power
to punish tribal offenders was a part of its inherent tribal sovereignty.47 It
further held that the double jeopardy clause did not bar tribal members’
subsequent federal prosecution for statutory rape arising out of the same
incident because the prosecutions were brought by separate sovereigns and
were not for the same offense.48 The Court also found that “when both a
federal prosecution for a major crime and a tribal prosecution for a lesser
included offense are possible, the defendant will often face the potential of
a mild tribal punishment and a federal punishment of substantial sever-
ity.”49
In 1989, the Ninth Circuit decided the Ant case.50 After confessing to a
crime even though he had not been advised of his Miranda rights, defendant
Ant entered a guilty plea in tribal court to a charge of “assault and battery”
in a matter that involved the death of an Indian woman.51 Separately, but
involving the same matter, the United States charged Ant with involuntary
manslaughter.52 The Ninth Circuit found that even though the uncounseled
tribal court guilty plea did not violate tribal law or the Indian Civil Rights
Act, because the plea would have been in violation of the Sixth Amendment
had it been made in federal court, and because suppression of Ant’s tribal
43. U.S. Const. amend V.
44. U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), superseded by statute on other grounds.
45. Id. at 313.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 328.
48. Id. at 313; U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
49. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 331.
50. U.S. v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989).
51. Id. at 1390.
52. Id.
7
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court guilty plea would not violate principles of comity, and would not dis-
parage tribal proceedings, the order of the district court denying suppression
of the pleas reversed the conviction.53 In sum, both sovereigns can proceed
against the same person in a related criminal matter but the federal court
may not admit the tribal evidence if it violates federal law.
Today in Montana, tribal and federal charges against the same person
for a related offense happen on a regular basis without challenge. From my
perspective, this is because the tribal sentence is considered to be signifi-
cantly “mild” enough not to trigger double jeopardy concerns under
Wheeler.
2. Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians and Non-member Indians
In the late 1970s, a Washington tribal court convicted defendant Oli-
phant of “assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest,” during a tribal
celebration.54 Oliphant was a non-Indian residing on the Port Madison In-
dian Reservation in Kitsap County, Washington. He filed a writ of habeas
corpus to the United States Supreme Court, claiming the Tribe had no au-
thority to punish him because he was not Indian.55 The Court relied on
Crow Dog,56 and decided that the Tribe lacked the authority to criminally
punish non-Indians on tribal lands.57 The Court stated, “an examination of
our earlier precedents satisfies us that . . . Indians do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, absent affirmative delegation of such power
by Congress.”58
On a related note, in Duro the Supreme Court grappled with whether a
tribal court had jurisdiction over non-member Indians and found that it did
not.59 In reaction, the holding in Duro was overturned by “emergency” leg-
islation that amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to clarify that tribal courts
have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.60
53. Id. at 1396.
54. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
55. Id.
56. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 563, 567.
57. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
58. Id.
59. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679.
60. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (3); See also, Mousseaux v. U.S. Comm’r of Indian Affairs, 806 F. Supp.
1433, 1439–1442 (1992).
8
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IV. A SHIFT IN POLICY – CONGRESS RESTORES SOME
TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION
A. Tribal Law and Order Act
Tribes and tribal people have been generally dissatisfied with the way
justice has been dispensed.61 To combat this issue, in 2009 U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder prioritized the Justice Department’s “engagement, co-
ordination, and action on public safety in Indian Country.”62 He held a Tri-
bal Nations Listening Tour in 2009.63 As a result of this effort, the Depart-
ment of Justice dedicated funds and resources in hopes of addressing vio-
lence in Indian Country.64 After these efforts were undertaken by the
Justice Department, Congress enacted the Tribal Law and Order Act.65
The Tribal Law and Order Act focuses on “federal accountability and
coordination”; “state accountability and coordination”; “empowering tribal
law enforcement agencies and tribal governments”; encouraging “Indian
Country Crime Data Collection and Information Sharing”; and “Domestic
Violence and Sexual Assault Prosecution and Prevention.”66
Significantly, the Tribal Law and Order Act permits tribes to expand
their sentencing authority, potentially stacking three years for a maximum
sentence of three years.67 Now, tribal courts may stack three charges, which
permits tribes to sentence an offender for up to nine years.68 If the tribal
court does exercise its authority to impose a term of imprisonment greater
than one year, the Tribal Law and Order Act requires the tribe to:
(1) provide to the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel at
least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution; and
(2) at the expense of the tribal government, provide an indigent defendant the
assistance of a defense attorney licensed to practice law by any jurisdic-
tion in the United States that applies appropriate professional licensing
standards and effectively ensures the competence and professional re-
sponsibility of its licensed attorneys;
(3) require that the judge presiding over the criminal proceeding—
(A) has sufficient legal training to preside over criminal proceedings; and
(B) is licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States;
(4) prior to charging the defendant, make publicly available the criminal laws
(including regulations and interpretative documents), rules of evidence,
61. See Pevar, supra n. 11, at 131–134 (explaining the high violence rates in Indian Country).
62. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Tribal Justice and Safety, Tribal Law and Order Act, http://perma.cc/
3VKE-BPFH (http://www.justice.gov/tribal/tloa.html) (accessed Sept. 20, 2014).
63. Id.
64. Attorney General Announces Significant Reforms, Indian Country Today 10 (Jan. 27, 2010).
65. U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra n. 62.
66. Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. at 2261–2262 (2010).
67. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
68. Id. at § 1302(a)(7)(D).
9
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and rules of criminal procedure (including rules governing the recusal of
judges in appropriate circumstances) of the tribal government; and
(5) maintain a record of the criminal proceeding, including an audio or other
recording of the trial proceeding.69
The Tribal Law and Order Act also contemplates appropriate incarcer-
ation alternatives for tribal people sentenced under the Act.70 The Act per-
mits a tribal court to require the defendant:
(1) to serve the sentence—
(A) in a tribal correctional center that has been approved by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs for long-term incarceration, in accordance with
guidelines to be developed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (in con-
sultation with Indian tribes) not later than 180 days after July 29,
2010;
(B) in the nearest appropriate Federal facility, at the expense of the
United States pursuant to the Bureau of Prisons tribal prisoner pilot
program described in section 304(c) of the Tribal Law and Order Act
of 2010;
(C) in a State or local government-approved detention or correctional
center pursuant to an agreement between the Indian tribe and the
State or local government; or
(D) in an alternative rehabilitation center of an Indian tribe; or
(2) to serve another alternative form of punishment, as determined by the
tribal court judge pursuant to tribal law.71
B. The Violence Against Women Act Expands Tribal Court Jurisdiction
over Non-Indian Perpetrators of Domestic Violence
Three years after the Tribal Law and Order Act was enacted, the Vio-
lence Against Women Reauthorization Act was enacted.72 The Violence
Against Women Act added two new assault charges relevant to a spouse,
intimate partner, or dating partner: (1) “assault resulting in substantial bod-
ily injury”; and (2) “assault . . . by strangling, suffocating, or attempting to
strangle or suffocate.”73
Relevant to the jurisdictional discussion in this article, the Violence
Against Women Act included an amendment that provides a limited Oli-
phant fix. This amendment “authorizes tribes to assert criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indian perpetrators of misdemeanor crimes of domestic vio-
lence.74 It confers tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians only in
69. Id. at § 1302(c).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act became Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54
(2013) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) in 2013. The Tribal Law and Order Act became
Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(b), 124 Stat. 2258, 2263 (2010) in 2010.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(7)–(8).
74. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(6).
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 76 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol76/iss1/7
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON108.txt unknown Seq: 11 25-MAR-15 13:59
2015 COOPERATIVE (AND UNCOOPERATIVE) FEDERALISM 137
crimes related to domestic and dating violence, or criminal violations of
related protection orders.75 In regard to crimes involving Indians or Indian
country, the Violence Against Women Act does not apply to “crimes com-
mitted outside of Indian country; crimes between two non-Indians; crimes
between two strangers, including sexual assaults; crimes committed by a
person who lacks sufficient ties to the tribe, such as living or working on its
reservation; and child abuse or elder abuse that does not involve the viola-
tion of a protection order.”76
The jurisdictional piece of the Violence Against Women Act took ef-
fect on March 7, 2015.77 To be eligible to exercise special domestic vio-
lence criminal jurisdiction, a tribe must provide services similar to those
required for Tribal Law and Order Act enhanced sentencing. For example, a
tribe must provide to the defendant the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution; pro-
vide a law-trained judge; provide access to the tribe’s laws; and maintain a
record of the criminal proceeding, including an audio or other recording of
the trial proceeding.78
One of the most interesting requirements is the condition that the tribe
must include a “fair cross section of the community” in jury pools and “not
systematically exclude any distinctive group in the community, including
non-Indians.”79 Until now, tribal court juries were filled with tribal mem-
bers. It is unclear whether non-Indians would be interested in sitting on a
tribal court jury. And what if a non-Indian refuses to serve? The tribal court
lacks authority to issue a criminal subpoena over non-Indians who may be
nonresponsive to a tribal court jury summons. How then does a tribe guar-
antee that a non-Indian defendant has a jury of his peers if non-Indians
refuse to participate in the process? This question remains unanswered.
Neither the Tribal Law and Order Act nor the Violence Against Wo-
men Act stripped the federal government of its ability to assert jurisdiction
over criminal matters. In other words, should a tribe opt to expand jurisdic-
tion under the Tribal Law and Order Act and/or the Violence Against Wo-
men Act, both tribal and federal authorities have the ability to prosecute the
75. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Tribal Justice and Safety, Violence against Women Act (VAWA)
Reauthorization 2013, http://perma.cc/KYF8-NFAU (http://www.justice.gov/tribal/violence-against-
women-act-vawa-reauthorization-2013-0) (accessed Nov. 30, 2014).
76. Id.
77. Id.; U.S. Dep’t of Just., Tribal Justice and Safety, Violence against Women Act (VAWA)
Reauthorization 2013, VAWA 2013 Pilot Project, http://perma.cc/VXY9-RQRK (http://www.justice.
gov/tribal/vawa-2013-pilot-project) (accessed Nov. 30, 2014) (On February 6, 2014, the Department of
Justice granted pilot project applications for the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation
of Oregon, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona, and the Tulalip Tribes of Washington.).
78. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d).
79. Id. at § 1304(d)(3)(A)–(B).
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same defendant for the same conduct. In fact, the Violence Against Women
Act states that “nothing in this section affects the obligation of the United
States, or any State government that has been delegated authority by the
United States, to investigate and prosecute any criminal violation in Indian
country.”80
In my travels to different Montana reservations, members of the tribal
governments and courts have expressed to me an interest in restoring their
jurisdiction under the Tribal Law and Order Act and Violence Against Wo-
men Act. The tribes on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation have made signifi-
cant efforts to meet the requirements of the respective laws. For example,
Fort Peck’s tribal government participated in an Inter-Tribal Working
Group that specifically focused on implementing the Violence Against Wo-
men Act pilot project.81 Additionally, Fort Peck has made revisions to its
code, made all of its laws accessible to the public, and has made efforts to
assure that an attorney public defender is available.82
The Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Dis-
trict of Montana encourage tribes to opt into restoring their jurisdiction.83
When testifying in front of the United States Sentencing Commission in
February 2014, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sam Hirsch and U.S.
Attorney Michael W. Cotter lauded the opportunities provided by the Vio-
lence Against Women Act:
[The Act] represents a historic step forward for tribal sovereignty and juris-
diction. It recognizes the tribes’ inherent power to exercise ‘special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction’ over those who commit acts of domestic vio-
lence or dating violence or violate certain protection orders in Indian Country,
regardless of their Indian or non-Indian status.84
80. Id. at § 1302(f).
81. Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Alphabetical List of Tribes Who Have Submitted Preliminary Ex-
pressions of Interest to Implement SDVCJ (Section 904 Tribal Jurisdiction) and Participate in ITWG,
http://perma.cc/FF9L-4BZU (http://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/pilot-project-itwg/about-itwg) (updated
Oct. 30, 2013).
82. Fort Peck Tribal Court, Assiniboine and Sioux Tribe, http://perma.cc/QX79-KNPY (http://
www.fptc.org) (accessed Jan. 13, 2015).
83. Sam Hirsch, Dep. Assoc. Atty. Gen., & Michael W. Cotter, U.S. Atty. for the Dist. of Mont.,
Statement before the U.S. Senten. Comm’n, Hearing on the Implementation of the Violence against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, at 6 (Feb. 13, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/R8YY-6SE6
(http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/201402
13/Testimony_Cotter_Hirsch.pdf)); U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Department of Justice Views on the Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Issues for Comment Published by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission in the Federal Register on January 17, 2014, at 8 (Mar. 6, 2014) (available at
http://perma.cc/P5XC-FCEM (http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-
hearings-and-meetings/20140313/Testimony_DOJ.pdf)) [hereinafter DOJ Views].
84. Hirsch & Cotter, supra n. 83, at 6; DOJ Views, supra n. 83, at 8.
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V. SO. . .TRIBAL OR FEDERAL?
If a tribe in Montana elects to proceed with Tribal Law and Order Act
and Violence Against Women Act expansion of jurisdiction, both federal
and tribal authorities would then have concurrent jurisdiction over the sce-
narios presented at the beginning of this article.
Returning to the two case studies, imagine the questions that arise
when charging decisions are made:
1. If incarceration is part of the sentence, where will the defendant
be incarcerated?
2. Is there an advantage to having the defendant closer to his home
community?
3. Does the Tribe have adult probation services?
4. Should substance abuse treatment be part of a sentence? If so,
which sovereign might provide the best treatment for the defen-
dant?
5. What type of sentence is the court likely to hand down?
6. In the event the tribal court exercises its sentencing flexibility, do
robust tribal programs exist that can provide a more effective
“punishment” than incarceration?
7. How old is the defendant? Has he or she previously disregarded
tribal court sentences?
8. What is the defendant’s criminal history?
9. Does the tribe have the resources to deal with the concern at
hand?
10. Which code provides the more appropriate criminal charge?
11. As tribal courts generally only have a one-year statute of limita-
tion, can the tribal prosecutor bring an action within the appropri-
ate time frame?
12. Does this defendant pose an immediate danger? If so, which sov-
ereign can act faster to get the defendant off the streets?
Making appropriate charging decisions requires an honest assessment
of resources, frank discussions between tribal and federal officials, and an
institutionalized plan that describes an appropriate communication scheme.
VI. MONTANA – A DISTRICT WITH A PLAN
The United States Attorney’s Office, District of Montana, has an In-
dian Crime Unit dedicated to the prosecution of violent crime in Indian
13
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Country.85 The Unit is guided by the District of Montana Indian Country
Law Enforcement Initiative Operational Plan. The Operational Plan lays out
an explicit plan for communication and collaboration in Indian Country.86
A. Operational Plan
Part of the Operational Plan is as follows:
Investigations and Prosecutions: It is crucial that the [U.S. Attorney’s Of-
fice] inform tribal law enforcement about charging decisions, including cases
not resolved in federal court. It is equally important that cases are staffed by
the Tribe and the [U.S. Attorney’s Office] on a regular basis so that the most
appropriate charging decision, both crime and jurisdiction, is made as quickly
as possible.
USAO/Tribal Prosecution Phone Conference: On a bi-monthly basis, the
[Assistant U.S. Attorney](s) assigned to a particular reservation, the tribal
prosecutor(s), and representatives from federal and tribal law enforcement
will staff cases that have arisen on that reservation by talking about potential
charges and whether the case is most appropriately prosecuted in tribal court,
federal court, or both courts. A permanent record of cases staffed will be
maintained by the [U.S. Attorney’s Office]. Efforts will be made to assure
that [the Legal Information On-Line System] accurately reflects those cases
that are referred to the tribal system and track the disposition of cases referred
to tribal court.
Written Resolution of Cases: The resolution of cases that are referred for
consideration of federal prosecution, and later resolved by referral to the tribal
court, or because of an inability to prosecute must be in writing before the
Tribe’s statute of limitations period expires, if possible. The resolution letter
will be provided by the [Assistant U.S. Attorney] to the referring agency. The
resolution letter will also be provided to the tribal prosecutor to inform him or
her of the decision. The investigating agency or victim of a crime can obtain a
review of that decision. Our “second look policy” is invoked when the inves-
tigating agency or the victim of a crime that has been resolved other than by
federal prosecution asks the AUSA to review the matter for a second opinion.
Additionally, the [Assistant U.S. Attorney] with primary responsibility as tri-
bal liaison for cases arising on a particular reservation is always available to
answer questions and provide legal advice. The [U.S. Attorney’s Office] does
not resolve cases referred to our office orally.
Sharing Information With Tribal Prosecutor: If a case is not appropriate
for federal prosecution and is referred to tribal court, the lead investigative
85. United States Attorney’s Office, District of Montana Criminal Division, http://perma.cc/8JFZ-
NT7D (http://www.justice.gov/usao/mt/criminal.html) (accessed Jan. 13, 2015).
86. For a description of other districts’ plans, see Brendan V. Johnson, U.S. Atty. For the Dist. of
S.D., Statement before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, Tribal Law and Order Act One Year
Later: Have We Improved Public Safety and Justice Throughout Indian Country (Sept. 22, 2011) (avail-
able at http://perma.cc/7D5P-A5P9 (http://www.indian.senate.gov/sites/default/files/upload/files/
Brendan-Johnson-testimony.pdf)).
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agency will, within 10 days from the date of the notice that federal prosecu-
tion is not appropriate, provide the tribal prosecutor with all appropriate re-
ports, evidence, and information available to insure successful prosecution.
The [U.S. Attorney’s Office] will provide all pertinent case file information.
Sharing Information Among Investigative Agencies: Investigators rely on
databases to conduct investigations. Agencies must share information by
computer through databases and other on-line services. It is important that all
investigative agencies working in Indian Country have access to software and
computers that allow them to share information with each other.
Federal Agent Cooperation with Tribal Court: Federal agents working in
Indian Country have a responsibility to the Tribal Court to cooperate by hon-
oring subpoenas and providing evidence and testimony for proceedings in
tribal court.87
Due to the frequent overlap between tribal and federal governments in
Indian Country, the two governments need a clear guideline outlining each
government’s role in different situations. This guideline should be institu-
tionalized in a publication  that can provide tribes and the federal govern-
ment the necessary framework to ensure maximum cooperation and prevent
cases from falling through the cracks. Additionally, when tribal and federal
systems are making joint charging decisions, the systems can avoid over-
charging an individual and drawing a Wheeler challenge.
Because of the frequent contact between the federal government and
tribes, another benefit is that stakeholders are able to speak bluntly regard-
ing training needs. As a result, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, along with its
training partners, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the State of Montana
Attorney General’s Office, and others, have responded to numerous training
requests.88
B. Participation in Multidisciplinary Teams and Sexual Assault
Response Teams
In addition to increased communication, federal prosecutors, including
me, collaborate with individual tribes in other formal ways. For example,
every month federal prosecutors participate in multidisciplinary team meet-
ings (MDTs). These multidisciplinary teams focus on the criminal investi-
gation and prosecution of the physical and sexual abuse and neglect of chil-
dren. The teams are composed of multiple entities including tribal and fed-
87. District of Montana Indian Country Law Enforcement Initiative Operational Plan, 2014 (On file
with author).
88. For example, see Press Release from U.S. Dep’t of the Int., Off. of the Asst. Sec.—Indian
Affairs, BIA Office of Justice Services to Hold Third Tribal Court Trial Advocacy Training Session in
Helena, Mont. 1 (May 15, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/U3SY-GQ4U (http://www.bia.gov/cs/
groups/public/documents/text/idc1-026710.pdf)).
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eral prosecutors; tribal, BIA, and FBI law enforcement; tribal social
services; medical personnel (such as pediatricians); mental health profes-
sionals; and victims’ advocates. The diversity in skill, experience, and per-
spective allows the team to make effective staffing decisions. Additionally,
the participants establish case timelines and action plans. While multidis-
ciplinary team meetings overlap with similar staffing that occurs via child
protection teams, the multidisciplinary team’s focus on prosecution permits
the child protection teams to focus on intervention and child protection
plans rather than criminal investigations.
The information sharing among the members of the multidisciplinary
team is one of the major benefits of this system. For example, when a po-
tential defendant’s name is raised in a team meeting, additional victims of
this same potential defendant may be identified. This can be significant to a
federal prosecution for a variety of reasons. For example, in federal court,
similar crimes of sexual assault and child molestation can be admitted as
relevant evidence.89 Many times, especially in historical sexual abuse cases,
a federal prosecutor will have no physical evidence to admit into the record.
In a case I personally tried, additional victim testimony was helpful in se-
curing a conviction.90
In June 2012, Tony West, Acting Associate Attorney General at the
time, and U.S. Attorney Michael W. Cotter announced the establishment of
“sexual assault response teams . . . in the six Montana reservations under
federal jurisdiction.”91 I have served as a team member of two reservation
teams. The sexual assault response teams staff similar cases to those staffed
by multidisciplinary teams with some notable differences; namely, sexual
assault response teams are purposed toward staffing known cases of sexual
assaults of adults. Due to the compositional similarity of sexual assault re-
sponse teams and multidisciplinary teams, many members play roles in both
groups, but some do not. For example, the medical provider team member
is usually a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner and not a pediatrician.
In Montana, some county attorney offices (Glacier and Big Horn
County) have participated in collaborative prosecution meetings, multidis-
ciplinary teams, and sexual assault response teams. A perpetrator of violent
crime who is known in reservation communities may have also committed
crimes off of the reservation. The ability for federal, county, and tribal law
enforcement to have confidential discussions enables law enforcement offi-
89. Fed. R. Evid. 413, 414; U.S. v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding there is
“nothing fundamentally unfair about the allowance of propensity evidence under Rule 414”).
90. See e.g. U.S. v. Bullcalf, 563 Fed. Appx. 535, 536 (9th Cir. 2014).
91. Press Release from U.S. Dep’t of Just., Acting Associate Attorney General Tony West and U.S.
Attorney Michael W. Cotter Announce Pilot Initiative to Address Sexual Assault on Montana Reserva-
tions (June 6, 2012) (available at http://perma.cc/3M2E-PUY7 (http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/acting-
associate-attorney-general-tony-west-and-us-attorney-michael-w-cotter-announce-pilot)).
16
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cials to have a broader understanding of the criminal conduct. Further,
when law enforcement fully understands the timing of potential indictments
or proceedings in other courts, officials can plan better and more effectively
utilize law enforcement resources.
C. Special Assistant United States Attorneys Program
As stated by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sam Hirsch and U.S.
Attorney Michael W. Cotter in their testimonies in front of the United
States Sentencing Commission in February 2014:
Tribal [Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys] are tribal prosecutors who are
‘cross-deputized’ and able to prosecute crimes in both tribal court and federal
court as appropriate. These Tribal [Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys] are able
to strengthen tribal governments’ role in fighting Indian Country crime and
improve U.S. Attorney coordination with tribal law enforcement personnel.
In 2012, the Office on Violence Against Women . . . augmented the existing
Tribal [Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys] program through awards to four
tribes in Nebraska, New Mexico, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
The goal of the Tribal [Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys] program is for every
prosecutable crime of intimate partner violence to be pursued in federal court,
tribal court, or both.92
In Montana, the Fort Belknap Indian Community was the recipient of
the Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys award.93 The goal of the program is
twofold: (1) to train tribal prosecutors in federal law, procedure, and inves-
tigative techniques; and (2) to increase the likelihood that every viable vio-
lence against women criminal offense is prosecuted in tribal court, federal
court, or both.94 Tribal prosecutors serve as co-counsel with federal prose-
cutors on felony investigations and prosecutions of offenses arising out of
their respective tribal communities.95 The Fort Belknap Tribal Special As-
sistant U.S. Attorney is veteran county and tribal prosecutor Yvonne Laird.
Laird and I have served as co-counsel on each other’s cases and both par-
ticipate on the Fort Belknap MDT and sexual assault response teams. Laird
participates fully in federal court matters, including trial work, hearings,
and resolution of criminal matters arising on the Fort Belknap reservation.
92. Hirsch & Cotter, supra n. 83, at 4; DOJ Views, supra n. 83, at 6–7.
93. Press Release from U.S. Dep’t of Just., Office on Violence against Women Announces Agree-
ments to Cross-Designate Tribal Prosecutors in Nebraska, New Mexico, Montana, North Dakota and
South Dakota (June 5, 2012) (available at http://perma.cc/4J7W-LPNB (http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
office-violence-against-women-announces-agreements-cross-designate-tribal-prosecutors)) (Although
the Crow Tribe does not currently have a SAUSA, it had one appointed in the past. The Fort Peck Tribe
is expected to get a SAUSA to help contend with the increase of violence related to the Bakken
oilfield.).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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The Department hopes that “[t]he work of Tribal [Special Assistant
U.S. Attorneys] can also help to accelerate implementation of the Tribal
Law and Order Act of 2010 by addressing the broader need for skilled,
committed prosecutors, be they [Assistant U.S. Attorneys] or Tribal [Spe-
cial Assistant U.S. Attorneys], working on the ground in Indian Country.”96
Consistent with that goal, Attorney General Holder announced a “new fel-
lowship within the Attorney General’s Honors Program—the Attorney
General’s Indian Country Fellowship.”97 The fellowship is intended to “cre-
ate opportunities for highly qualified law school graduates to spend three
years working on Indian Country cases, primarily in U.S. Attorneys’ Of-
fices, developing a pool of attorneys with deep experience in Federal Indian
law, tribal law, and Indian Country issues.”98
VII. CONCLUSION
The two examples at the beginning of this article illustrate the types of
cases staffed by federal and tribal officials. In my experience, the most sig-
nificant factor that drives a joint charging decision is a resolution between
the sovereigns regarding which system has the best resources to contend
with the criminal matter. Until tribes can fully fund their own tribal criminal
justice systems, jurisdictional restoration under the Tribal Law and Order
Act and the Violence Against Women Act will not be realized.
To illustrate the point, I am aware that the Fort Belknap Indian Com-
munity operated without an adult probation office for a term. Assuming the
Community fulfilled the requirements for restored jurisdiction under the Vi-
olence Against Women Act, the Community might agree to assert jurisdic-
tion in Case Study #1, and should the defendant be convicted, the tribal
court would put the burden on the defendant to find his or her own anger
management and/or substance abuse treatment programs and pay for them
himself or herself. The Tribe would likely find this to be the only solution
because the non-Indian defendant would not be eligible for tribal services.
In Case Study #2, the Community would probably refer the case to
federal prosecutors simply because the Tribe cannot provide effective su-
pervision.
To illustrate this point further, because of the condition of the tribal
detention facility a tribal judge may not feel comfortable sentencing a per-
son to a term over one year. Without faith in the detention facilities, and
96. Hirsch & Cotter, supra n. 83, at 4; DOJ Views, supra n. 83, at 7.
97. Hirsch & Cotter, supra n. 83, at 4; DOJ Views, supra n. 83, at 7. (For more information about
the fellowship, see U.S. Dep’t of Just., Legal Careers, The Gaye L. Tenoso Indian Country Fellowship,
http://perma.cc/2T6G-PSPS (http://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/attorney-generals-indian-country-fel
lowship) (accessed Nov. 30, 2014)).
98. Hirsch & Cotter, supra n. 83, at 4–5; DOJ Views, supra n. 83, at 7.
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notwithstanding the Bureau of Prisons pilot project opportunity, this Tribe
would likely press for the federal prosecutors to charge both of the cases.
Fort Peck and the Chippewa Cree Tribes have brand new detention
facilities located on their respective reservations.99 It is no coincidence that
these two reservations expressed to me the most interest in restoring juris-
diction under the Violence Against Women Act amendments to the Tribal
Law and Order Act.
Nationwide, 26% of cases referred to the federal system are for crimes
of sexual abuse.100 Until Tribes have the ability to provide sex offender
treatment as an aspect of a tribal sentence, these cases will likely continue
to be federal matters.
Further, because of the federal government’s greater access to forensic
and expert resources, it is likely that tribes will refer homicide cases to
federal authorities. This is also true because most tribal officials see the
need for a homicide sentence to exceed three years.
The virtues of restoring criminal jurisdiction to the tribes can be ex-
tolled far and wide, but will not become a reality until tribal systems are
fully funded. Until then, the federal presence in crimes arising in Indian
Country will continue to be significant. Even though the federal system, at
least in Montana, will continue to be the major player in prosecuting major
crimes, Montana’s model of collaboration and communication between fed-
eral and tribal partners is important for purposes of fostering tribal “buy-
in.” Likewise, should Montana tribes assert tribal court jurisdiction under
the Tribal Law and Order Act or the Violence Against Women Act, Mon-
tana’s model will facilitate the staffing of cases in a manner that would
prevent a defendant from being charged in two systems for the same crime.
The federal government continues to have significant power in Indian
Country. Therefore, it should make a significant effort to institutionalize a
collaboration and communication system that includes the participation of
those most affected by crime on the reservations––those who actually live
on the reservation.
99. Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Correctional Systems and Correctional
Alternatives on Tribal Lands, Fort Peck Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes–Construction of Fort Peck New
Adult Detention Facilities, http://perma.cc/9JJL-PLUB (https://www.bja.gov/programs/tri-
bal_corrections/20.html) (accessed Jan. 13, 2015); Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Correctional Systems and Correctional Alternatives on Tribal Lands, Chippewa Cree
Tribe–Construction of Chippewa Cree Multi-Purpose Jail Facility, http://perma.cc/F5CZ-DFXH (https:/
/www.bja.gov/programs/tribal_corrections/30.html) (accessed Jan. 13, 2015).
100. See Hon. Byron Dorgan, Hon. John Barrasso, Hon. John Thune, U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Declinations of Indian Country Criminal Matters, 9 (Dec. 13, 2010) http://
perma.cc/FYW4-4YTF (http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/97229.pdf) (accessed Jan. 13, 2015).
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